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OF TRAILER CAMPS

AND

PARKS-Plaintiff challenged the validity of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance of the defendant township which barred all trailer camps and
parks from its industrial district. As trailer parks had previously been
zoned out of the business, residential, and agricultural districts, this amendment had the effect of completely excluding them from the entire township, although approximately half of its twenty-three square miles consisted
of open rural area. The parties stipulated that the plans of the plaintiff,
who wanted to develop a trailer park on his premises, met all of the
applicable health standards. The trial court sustained the amendment, but
its decision was reversed by the appellate division.1 On appeal by the
township to the New Jersey Supreme Court, held, reversed, two justices
dissenting.2 As the exclusion of trailer parks was deemed necessary to
enable the township to realize its full potential for extensive and rapid
growth as a well-ordered community attractive to industry, the amendment
to the zoning ordinance barring trailer parks from its industrial district
constitutes a valid exercise of the zoning power of the township. Vickers
v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 233 (1963).
The power to zone is derived from the police power of a state. Townships, or other political subdivisions of a state, must rely upon a specific
delegation of this power, by statute or constitutional provision, as a prerequisite to its exercise.3 The zoning power is also subject to the more

Vickers v. Township Comm., 68 N.J. Super. 263, 172 A.2d 218 (1961).
The dissenting justices felt that it was arbitrary to permit the prohibition of mobile
home parks in a municipality where they can be placed in appropriate districts and
where there is a demand for them.
3 YOKLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE § 27 (1948). The New Jersey constitution empowers the legislature to enact general laws "under which municipalities ••. may adopt
zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified districts and regulating therein,
buildings and structures, according to their construction, and the nature and extent of
their use and the nature and extent of the uses of land, and the exercise of such
authority shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State." N.J. CoNsr.
art. IV, § 6. Pursuant to this provision the New Jersey legislature has given municipalities extensive power to create districts and regulate structures and the use of land
therein through the use of zoning ordinances. N.J. REv. STAT.§§ 55-30 to -31 (1937). For a
complete discussion of the delegation of the police power of a state to municipalities
or other governmental units, see 6 McQUII..LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§ 24.86 to
.39 (3d ed. 1949).
1
2
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general and elusive limitation that its arbitrary and unreasonable use to
effectuate the absolute prohibition of a type of property use that is not
detrimental to the public welfare will be deemed unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection of the laws and of due process of law:1
Although the courts have the power to prevent the exercise of the police
power from infringing constitutional rights, judicial supervision is restricted in this context by an assumption that a zoning ordinance is
warranted by the location, property, and surroundings to which it applies.5
When the reasonableness of an ordinance is in question, the courts often
decline to substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body which
is charged with the primary duty and responsibility with respect to zoning
matters. 6 Since opinions dealing with exclusionary zoning ordinances often
speak in generalities, it is difficult to discern a pattern of standards into
which such an ordinance must fit in order to be upheld. Few courts have
been faced with this problem in the context of a total exclusion of trailer
parks from a municipal unit, as the vast majority of governmental units
have chosen rather to relegate trailer parks to certain defined areas and
impose particular health and safety regulations on them. 7 Decisions which
have upheld ordinances precluding trailer parks in a particular area of
a municipal unit are based on a wide variety of rationales. For instance,
exclusion from a residential district has been deemed justifiable to prevent
sewage disposal problems, 8 overcrowding of schools, 9 and diminution of
surrounding property values. 10 A Detroit ordinance requiring neighborhood consent to the presence of trailer parks was upheld on the basis of
public interest in having no large groups of people living in homes for
which they pay no real estate taxes. 11 The validity of an ordinance which
completely excluded heavy industry from a municipality was in issue in the
Duffcon case. 12 The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion indicated that
such an ordinance may be imposed if in accordance with the most appropriate use of the land throughout the municipality and that such appropriateness may depend not only upon the physical, economic, and social
conditions prevailing within the municipality and its present and reasonably prospective needs, but also upon the nature of the entire region in
which the municipality is located and the use to which the land in such
4 6 J\!cQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 24.63; 7 id. §§ 24.324 to .325; RATHKOPF, THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 6 (2d ed. 1949). See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 774, 779 (1952).
Ii RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 6, 18; YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 35·36.
o RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4, § 19.
7 HODES & ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE Ho?t!ES 88 (1957). The authors of
this book have set out all of the state statutes dealing with mobile homes up to 1957
and present an extensive discussion of various aspects of the law dealing with mobile
homes.
'
8 Stevens v. Township of Royal Oak, 342 Mich. 105, 68 N.W.2d 787 (1955).
o Ibid.
10 Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
11 Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939).
12 Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
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region has been or may appropriately be put. The court upheld the ordinance on the grounds that the physical location and circumstances of the
small residential municipality were such that it was best suited for continued residential development and, separated from it but in the same
geographical region, there was present a concentration of industry in an
area peculiarly adapted to industrial development and sufficiently large
to accommodate such development for years to come. The United States
Supreme Court has pointed out that a regulatory ordinance "which would
be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as
applied to rural communities."13 This distinction has been applied by
state courts to invalidate ordinances excluding trailer parks from agricultural areas on the grounds that exclusion from an open and undeveloped
area neither promotes nor has a reasonable and substantial relation to
the public welfare.14 Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court has refused to compromise an owner's right to free use of property on the basis
of speculation that conditions might develop with regard to which the
application of the ordinance would enhance the public welfare.15
On the other hand, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the principal case seems to leave no theoretical limitation on the exclusion
of trailer parks by state governmental units. The court based its decision
on precedent and upon the proposition that zoning must subserve the
long-range needs of the comm.unity. The court broadly construed language from a decision which had upheld an ordinance of a small and completely developed borough prohibiting future construction of apartment
houses within its borders16 to mean that a municipality does not have to
provide for every type of land use within its borders. In the same vein the
court relied upon a case which had upheld an ordinance barring motels
from a developed community consisting of business, residential, and industrial zones.17 At no point in its opinion did the court cite a case which
13 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). This is the
landmark case on comprehensive zoning in the United States, the reasoning of which
has been widely referred to and relied upon by state and federal courts throughout the
years. YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 20. Since the Euclid decision, the Supreme Court
has practically withdrawn from the zoning field, with certiorari being consistently refused
in zoning cases since 1930.
14 Gust v. Township of ·Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955) (township ordinance); Stevens v. Stillman, 18 Misc. 2d 274, 186 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (town
ordinance).
15 Gust v. Township of Canton, supra note 14.
16 Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958). The
court also relied on the case of Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill,
1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). Problems of total exclusion of certain land uses, analogous
to those presented by the principal case, have arisen under high minimum lot size
zoning regulations and high minimum floor space regulations, as exemplified respectively
in Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), and Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. -165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952). For commentary on
these cases and a general discussion of zoning law in New Jersey, see Cunningham,
Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 37 (1959).
17 Pierro v. Ba.xendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955).
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dealt with the exclusion of a particular mode of living from a spacious and
undeveloped area; therefore, something more than stare decisis was needed
to sustain the holding. In a prior decision the court had committed itself
to the view that zoning must subserve long-range objectives as well as the
needs of the present and immediately foreseeable future. 18 It was argued
that maximum community benefits in the future could be derived only
from comprehensive zoning which provided for an attractive industrial
area and compatible residential districts. The court pointed out that the
current industrial development in the state is taking place in communities
where nuisances are excluded and attractive architecture prevails. Therefore, the court held that, in order to attract industry, trailer parks, which
bring problems of congestion and "attendant difficulties," may be excluded.
This rationale did not meet the thrust of the plaintiff's argument that the
township's development was not in fact simply limited to industrial and
residential uses. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
question of whether the power exists to forbid a particular type of property use is to be determined by considering the thing not abstractly, but
in connection with the existing circumstances and locality.19 Although
the court in the principal case attempted to justify its decision by pointing
to the need for an appropriate residential-industrial balance in the future,
the efficacy of this rationale is dubious since no industry was contemplating
a move into the township in the foreseeable future, and, even if industry
did move into the township, there was no indication that such an event
would change its course of diversified development. Neither practical
reality nor precedent justify excluding trailer parks from many square miles
of open area in which there is no conflict between trailer living and other
surrounding uses.
Such exclusionary ordinances have the potential of adversely affecting
a large number of people.20 Often the assumptions on which they are based,
linking trailer parks with itinerants and squalor, are no longer generally
valid; 21 in fact, some trailer parks fall within the luxury living category,22
and the primary groups living in trailer parks today are undoubtedly respectable citizens.23 There are many means of trailer park control, other than
18 Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
10

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

20 The number of mobile home dwellers has increased significantly in the last decade

to an all-time high of three million in 1960. BARTLEY &: BAm, MOBILE HoME PARKS AND
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING 12 (1960). Between 1951 and 1956 the mobile
home population doubled. HODES &: ROBERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3.
21 It is obvious that these assumptions often result in overt hostility toward the
mobile home-owning class. For example, one township ordinance dealt with trailers and
gypsies together. Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 Pa. D. &: C. 125 (C.P. 1941). In the case
of Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), the counsel for the city
asserted that trailer living tended to create immorality among children.
22 Fogarty, Trailer Parks: The Wheeled Suburbs, Architectural Forum, July 1959,
p. 127.
23 According to HoDES &: ROBERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4, the primary
groups of people who dwell in mobile homes are (1) young married couples, (2) defense
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total exclusion from a municipal unit, which protect the public from any
possible adverse effects attending the presence of a trailer park in the community.24 The most common measures take the form of stringent health
standards which must be complied with in order to qualify for and keep
the necessary license,25 and the imposition of reasonable building code
standards to prevent overcrowding.26 The power of a governmental unit
to tax trailers and trailer parks in order to meet regulatory expenses is
well established.27 With such regulatory measures available, a community
which, as in the principal case, encompasses a large amount of undeveloped
land could effectively provide for its long-range objectives without adopting the extreme measure of wholly excluding this popular mode of living.
Specifically, special zones could be established, within the now undeveloped
areas, in which trailer parks would be allowed. These zones could provide
for a minimum proximity to any adjacent land uses with which the presence of a trailer park would be incompatible. Such a solution would allow
the greatest possible use of property by landowners, while at the same
time permitting the municipal officials to effect the valid objectives of
the local zoning power.
Rolfe A. Worden, S.Ed.
and construction workers, (3) military personnel, (4) seasonal harvest workers, (5) traveling businessmen, and (6) retired people.

24 For example, one community limited the number of trailers within its borders
to those within the city at the time the ordinance was passed in order to keep a high
ratio of permanent to transient population. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., ZONING CODE § 47-49
(1947). Another community limited trailer parks to areas zoned for multiple housing,
subject to the restriction that they could not be located within 200 feet of permanent
residential buildings located outside the district. This ordinance was upheld in Huff
v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W.2d 54 (1952).
25 Local ordinance provisions restricting trailers to licensed parks are commonplace,
and they have been upheld as reasonably adopted to promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of the community. Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1953); Township of Wyoming v. Herweyer, 321 Mich. 611, 33 N.W.2d 93 (1948). See, e.g., MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 140, § 32A-B (1957), which provides for the licensing of trailer parks by
the board of health of a town or city with provision for periodic inspection by the
state and local health boards.
26 However, unreasonable building code standards are among the vehicles used to
effect the exclusion of trailers from a community. For instance, one community forced
trailers to leave because they could not meet a building code requirement of 384 square
feet to the first floor. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 168 Pa. Super. 442, 78 A.2d 880
(1951). It has been observed that trailers often cannot meet floor space requirements
without violating vehicle regulations, leaving the law-abiding trailer owner in a dilemma.
Brodnick v. Munger, 102 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
27 There is some dispute with respect to the methods of providing for additional
general community expenses resulting from the presence of a mobile home population.
The problem of taxation of trailers and trailer parks has been dealt with extensively.
See Note, 57 DICK. L. R.Ev. 338 (1953); Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. R£v. 738 (1955); Comment,
71 YALE L.J. 702 (1962).

